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The Effect of Diffusion and Concentration of
Responsibility on the Risky Shift Phenomenon
m a Two-choice Situation
GENE F. SMITH and THOMAS L. RADINSKY 1
Abstract. The role of diffusion of responsibility in the production of
the risky shift phenomenon was examined in a two-choice situation. Expected value of the two choices was held constant by varying payoffs inversely with their probabilities. After 100 trials alone, subjects were put
into one of three conditions for the next 100 trials: Control Condition,
Group Diffusion of Responsibility Condition or Group Concentration of
Responsibility Condition. No significant shifts were found in any of these
conditions. The Kogan and Wallach perdiction that diffusion of responsibility would lead to a greater risky shift was not supported. The results
were consistent with Zajonc, \Volosin, Wolosin, and Sherman's contention
that the utility of being correct produced a conservative shift in the group
condition of their experiment. The findings of the present experiment imply that the risky shift phenomenon may not occur under all diffusion of
rf'sponsibility conditions.

The risky shift phenomenon refers to the increased level of
risk taking which has been found to occur as the result of a group
discussion. Conversely, one would refer to a shift away from risk
as a conservative shift. The instrument for measuring risk taking
in most of the studies in which the risky shift phenomenon has
been found is the Choice Dilemmas Questionaire. In this questionaire, which was first used by Wallach and Kogan ( 1959), each
item describes a situation in which a hypothetical person must
decide between a risky but attractive course of action and a more
certain but less attractive alternative. The subject is asked to specify
the mimimum probability of success he would demand before advising the hypothetical person to attempt the risky alternative.
Each subject completes the Choice Dilemmas Questionaire twice.
The first time provides a measure of his initial risk taking level
and the second time is typically after a group discussion. In general the decisions following group discussions are riskier than the
mean of the individual decisions.

.

One explanation of the risky shift phenomenon was proposed
by Kogan and Wallach (Wallach & Kogan, 1965; Wallach, Kogan
& Bern, 1962). According to the diffusion of responsibility hypothesis, members of groups should be inclined to support riskier decisions than individuals because the responsibility for potential failure
is spread among the group members. Diffusion of responsibility is
thought to weaken group members' concern with the negative
aspects of the risky decision, thus enhancing its attractiveness. If
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the hypothesis is correct, responsibility should diffuse more readily
in larger compared to smaller groups, in cohesive groups and in
groups of anxious people, thus yielding greater risky shifts in these
groups. Some evidence supporting these predictions has been found
(Kogan & Wallach, 1967: Wallach & Kogan, 1965: Wallach,
Kogan, & Bern. 1964) .
While the diffusion of responsibility hypothesis assumes that
the risky shift is a general consequence of making choices in a
group, some evidence indicates that the conservative shift can
also occur. \Vhile most of the Choice Dilemmas Questionaire items
tend to elicit a risky shift, a few of the items do elicit a consistent
conservative shift (Myers, 1967). Why this should be is left unexplained by the diffusion off responsibility hypothesis. In addition
to the fact that some items of the Choice Dilemmas Questionaire
elicit conservative shifts, Zajonc, Wolosin, \Volosin. and Sherman
(] 968) have reported a consen·atiw shift in a two-choice situation. Unlike the situation with the Choice Dilemmas questionaire.
in the Zajonc ct al. study individuals made choices which had
direct and immediate consequences for themselves. The subject's
task was to predict which of two lights would occur on each of a
large number of trials. One light. if predicted correctly, yielded a
high payoff (1 Y2 cents), while the other light yielded a low ( 1
cent) payoff when correctly prPdicted. The high payoff choice was
correct on .6 of the tials, while the low payoff choice was correct
on .4 of the trials. Thus on each trial an individual had to choose
between a choice with a high payoff hut a low probability of success, and one with a lower payoff but a higher probability of success. The payoffs and their probabilities of occurrence were arranged so that the expected value of the two choices was equal.
After a number of trials during which individuals worked alone.
two conditions were formed. In one condition three individuals
were brought together and required to reach a consensus decision
on each trial. In the other condition individuals continued to work
alone for thP remaining trials. Groups exhibited a conservative
shift while individuals did not change.
The present experiment was designed to provide a comparison
of a diffusion of responsibility group condition with a concentration of responsibility group condition in a two-choice situation. The
Wallach and Kogan diffusion of responsibility hypothesis leads to
the prediction of a greater risky shift in the diffusion of responsibility condition than in the concentration of responsibility condition. The diffusion of responsibility condition in the pres,ent experiment is procedurally very similar to that of the Zajonc et al group
condition. Consequently, a conservative shift would be expected on
the basis of the results of the Zajonc et al study.
Zajonc et al suggested that an important contributor to their
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findings may have been that in the group situation individuals
placed value on making a correct prediction in addition to the
value placed on the monetary payoffs. Since the conservative
choice was correct more often than the risky choice, the conservative choice became preferred in the group situation. In order to
focus on risk taking behavior as such, the rightness-wrongness factor was reduced in importance in the present experiment by using
a situation where a payoff was given on every trial.
.METHOD

Subjects

The subjects were 144 undergraduates ( 72 male and 72 female)
from introductory psychology who participated to fulfill a course
requirement. The subjects participated in the experiment in groups
of three same-sexed individuals. Within each of the three conditions, 8 male and 8 female groups participated. Subjects were requested not to sign up for the same session as a friend.
Procedure

The three subjects were seated in separate rooms which had
oneway mirrors from which the E could observe the Ss. In each
subject's room was a control box on which two push-buttons were
located. A \'ertical panel rose behind the push-buttons, at the top
of which was a green pilot light labelled "choose." '\Then the
·'choose" light came on the subject was to select and press one of
the two buttons. Below the ''choose" light was a digital display
capable of indicating any one or two digit number. After the subjects had responded the displav was illuminated for three seconds.
During this time. the subjects recorded their payoffs on a sheet
provided for this purpose. After three seconds the equipment reset,
causing the display lights to go off and the "choose" lights to
come on again.

..

The subjects' payoffs depended on which button they pressed.
One button (the risky choice) gave a payoff of either 15 points
with a probability of .30 or of 4 points with a probability of . 70.
The other button (the conservative choice) gave either a payoff of
8 points with a probability of .65 or of 6 points with a probability
of .35. For half the subjects in each condition, the right-handed
button was the risky choice and the left-handed button the conservative choice, while the ren~rse was true for the remaining
subjects. The probabilities of occurrence of the payoffs were controlled by a tape reader. Three different tapes were prepared and
one was randomly selected for each experimental session, subject
to the constraint that each be used equally often in each condition.
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The sequence of occurrence of the payoffs was random, except for
the constraint that the probabilities be observed within each block
of 20 trials. The stimulus events and subjects' responses were recorded on an 8-channel paper tape punch.

Experimental Conditions
All subjects were given 200 trials. For the first 100 trials, all
subjects worked alone in their individual rooms. For the second
100 trials, subjects served in one of the following three conditions:

Responsibilit'y concentration condition. After the first 100 trials
subjects were told that the first part of the experiment was over.
Two subjects were led to the room of the third subject, where
the remainder of the experiment was conducted for all three subjects. Instructions were read in which it was stated that in the
second part of the experiment one of the subjects was to make the
decisions for the entire group. The decision maker was randomly
chosen by drawing cards. To insure that the decisions were made
only by the person selected, the other two people were told that
they were not to communicate with the decision-maker in any way.
A microphone was plugged in and the subjects were told that the
session would be terminated if any communication occurred and
that the E could monitor any violations of this restriction through
the one-way mirror. In addition, the two non-decision making
subjects were asked to position their chairs so that they could observe the payoffs.
Responsibility diffusion condition. After the first 100 trials
subjects were told that the first part of the experiment was over.
The experimenter then led the subjects from two of the rooms to
the third subject's room, where the remainder of the experiment
was conducted for all three subjects. Instructions were read to the
subjects by which they were informed that in the second part of
the experiment the group was to arrive at a consensus choice for
each decision. All group members were urged to participate in the
making of the decisions. One person in each group was randomly
selected to press the button chosen by the group for each decision.
To make this condition comparable to the concentration condition,
a microphone was plugged in and the subjects were told that the
experimenter could observe them through a one-way mirror in
order to observe the decision making process.
Individu.al condition. After the first 100 trials subjects were
told that the first part of the experiment was over. After a short
pause, the Ss were given additional brief instructions and a new
score sheet on which to record their payoffs. Subjects in this condition then continued to work alone in their individual rooms for
the second 100 trials. This condition served as a control for changes
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which might occur m·er time without changes m the !"xperimental
conditions.
RESULTS

An 8 x 2 x 3 analysis of variance, with within factors of blocks
of 25 trials and sessions and a between factor of conditions, was
performed on the number of risky choices. Noni" of the main effects
nor any of the interactions were significant at the .05 leveL The
mean number of risky responses in the three conditions for the first
100 and for the second 100 trials are shown in Table L
An additional analysis employing t-tests was performed on the
percentage shift scores. This analysis was performed to assess the
possibility that a floor effect may have operated for some groups,
thereby making a larger absolute conservative shift impossible.
The results were the same as that of the above analysis of variance.
Consequently, it appears that a floor effect did not play a significant role in the present experiment.
In addition. there were no apparent differences in the behavior
of males and females.
TABLE

I.

MEAN

PERCENTAGE OF R1sKY REsPo>: SES 1;-;

THE FmsT A>:D

SEC:O:'>D SESSIONS I>: EACH CONDITION.

•

First sess10n

Second session

Diffusion of responsibility

41.58

41.00

Concentration of responsibility

36.56

35.00

Control

35.43

33.93

Mean

:'17.86

36.65

DrscussroN

The results of the present experiment do not support Kogan
and Wallach's diffusion of responsibility hypothesis. No risky shift
was found in a group condition with either a diffusion of responsibility or a concentration of responsibility. In this respect, the
present results are in agreement with Zajonc rt al, who also failed
to obtain a risky shift in a two-choice situation. Thus a diffusion
of responsibility hypothesis apparently cannot account for the
behavior of groups in a two-choice situation with repeated trials.
On the other hand, the results of the present experiment did
not replicate the finding of a conservative shift in the Zajonc et al
study. One factor is that in the Zajonc et al study there was an
initial risky bias which did not occur in the present study. The
initial risky bias probably facilitated the subsequent finding of a
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conservative shift. The initial risky bias in the Zajonc et al experiment was most likely elicited because subjects were informed that
one choice, if correctly predicted, yielded 1 y2 cents and that the
other choice, if correctly predicted, yidded 1 cent. It seems plausible that people should prefer the 1Y2 -cent choice to the 1-cent
choice, at least until they learn that payoffs arc less likely with the
1 Yz-cent choice. In the present experiment, no information was
given about the potential payoffs available in the situation until
the individual had sampled the choices. Thus no risky bias was
present in the initial trials of the present experiment.
The results of the present experiment are consistent with the
Zajonc et al proposition that, in their experiment, the utility of
making a correct prediction may have been more important in the
group than in the individual condition. For the prediction task used
by Zajonc et al one or the other choice was correct on every trial.
By giving a payoff for each response, the rightness-wrongness
dichotomy was lessened and without it no conservative shift occurred.
However, the procedural differences between the present study
and the Za jonc et al study should not be over-emphasized. This is
because in a recent paper by Zajonc and his students (Wolosin,
Wolosin, and Zajonc, 1968) the conservative shift was not replicated under conditions very similar to those of the earlier Zajonc
Pt al ( 1968) experiment. Clearly, it is now necessary to try to
specify the boundary conditions of the risky shift. One boundary
condition may be that the phenomenon is found only with verbal
materials like the Choice Dilemmas Qucstionaire.
Finally it should be noted that in all of the two-choice experiments discussed here individuals were not responding only to the
expected value of the two choices. A clear preference for the conservative choice is uniformly present in all conditions of all experiments. It may be that although people value riskiness and admire
others who take risks, when faced with actually making choices for
themsflves, people prefer a conservative to a risky choice.
References
KoGA1', N., & WALLACH, M. A., 1967. Risk taking as a function of the
situation, the person, and the group. In G. Mandler et al., New directions in psycholo,;y: III. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
MYERS, D. G., 1967. Enhancement of initial risk taking: tendencies in
social situations. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Iowa.
WALLACH, M. A., & KoGAX, N., 1959. ]. Personal. 27, 555-564.
_ -·--·-- ____ , ____
_ ___ . & BEM, D. ]., 1962. ]. Abnorm.
Soc. Psych. 65, 75-86.
1965. ]. Exper. Soc. Psych. 1,
- - - - - - - - - - - & ---- ---- - - 1-19.
---1

https://scholarworks.uni.edu/pias/vol77/iss1/44

6

Smith and Radinsky: The Effect of Diffusion and Concentration of Responsibility on th
314

IOWA ACADEMY OF SCIENCE

[Vol. 77

,
---, &
1964. ]. Abnorm. Soc. Psych. 68, 263-274.
WoLosrn, R. J., WoLOsIN, M. A., & ZAJONC, R. B., 1968. Social facilitation effects in group risk taking. Paper presented at the Midwestern
Psychological Association convention, May, 1968.
ZAJONC, R. B., Wor.os1N. R. J., WoLosrn, M.A., & SHERMAN, S. J., 1968.
]. Exper. Soc. Psych. 4, 89-106.

Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 1970

7

